Forwarders should encourage exporters to become Known Consignors

Elliot Molemiby: Elliot Molemi, Aviation Security Consultant, Professional Aviation Services

 


 

Since the introduction of Part 108 into the Civil Aviation Regulations of South Africa there has been a total of 120 Known Consignors accredited by the Civil Aviation Authority, this number has gone up and down over the years and at the time of writing this post there were only 27 left. This number is dwarfed by that of approved Regulated Agents which stands at 136.

More disturbingly is that this means the country’s air cargo secure supply chain has lost 93 Known Consignors in the past 5 years or so. This slump can be attributed to numerous reasons; intangible commercial benefit, and insufficient knowledge by consignors, no targeted workshops by the authority to disseminate information and chief among all the subtle discouragement from Regulated Agents.

Known Consigor Definition_Known Consignor


The role the industry can play

From the CAA, Airlines and Ground Handlers, there is no member of the secure supply chain better positioned to encourage the participation of consignors in the secure supply chain than the Freight Forwarder. The forwarders have daily dealings with consignors. Consignors believe that Part 108 is an onerous process and the Designated Officials of Regulated Agents can help in allaying this myth. Continue reading

Charter operators, why risk ruin?

There is a practical and moral obligation upon all of us to do whatever needs to be done to keep the flying public, which of course includes our mothers, brothers, sisters, cousins and friends, safe from the terror and tragedy of an IED (improvised explosive device) or other cowardly act perpetrated by unhinged minds.

It is almost inconceivable that operators are not aware of cargo security requirements as set out in Annexure 17 of ICAO and Part 108 of our local regulations.

The idea is to establish a tight and secure security conduit, from consignor to aircraft, providing not only the physical security against acts of terror but also a recorded audit trail.

Alternatively (the case with charter flights) to make all cargo secure by proper screening methods.

For terror to succeed, it only takes apathy from the aviation industry

It is almost inconceivable that operators are not aware of cargo security requirements as set out in Annexure 17 of ICAO and Part 108 of our local regulations.

The idea is to establish a tight and secure security conduit, from consignor to aircraft, providing not only the physical security against acts of terror but also a recorded audit trail. Alternatively (the case with charter flights) to make all cargo secure by proper screening methods.

It is pertinent to remind operators of the definition of cargo in the regulations:

‘Cargo means any property carried on an aircraft other than mail, stores, unaccompanied or mishandled baggage’.

It should be well noted that private flights are also subject to these requirements.

Amendment 13 to ICAO Annexure 17 standard 4.6.4 (effective 15 July 2013), which insists that cargo must be confirmed and accounted for, by a Regulated Agent (in South Africa approved under Part 108) or an entity approved by an appropriate authority (SA CAA), emphasises requirements.

Complying with the Part 108 regulations is not a complicated process nor is it expensive

The threat of ruin by non-compliance is not idle speculation or unfounded rhetoric. The South African Part 108 regulations make it obligatory for Air Carriers, which include charter to make cargo known.

If there were a major incident (and perhaps we should do away with the niceties and simply say a crash involving loss of life) legal suits and legal investigation would erupt in all directions from the numerous entities that would be involved in such a situation.

It is my view, which I have reached, over the many years that I have been involved in air cargo security and the hundreds of conversations that I have had with local, international and other role players from airline personnel, regulators, insurance underwriters, lawyers (and I could go on).

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Rob Garbett

That if you, as an operator, have not complied with what is required under Annexure 17 of ICAO, as contained in Part 108 of our local regulations, your business, no matter what its size, could collapse under the weight of claims made against you.

The simple principle is that if you are aware of the terrorist threat and are informed of what has been prescribed internationally as preventative measures, and choose not to adopt these measures, you will be held liable.

The ‘corporate veil’ has reached such levels of transparency that personal liability by directors and senior personnel is also a very real nightmare.

Perhaps more important than the legal or material point of view, is the moral question.

If people are killed in an air crash in horrific circumstances, you may have helped to prevent such slaughter, how would you feel?

Dangerous Goods covered under Part 92 is another area deserving concern. The application of the principals and requirements for the carriage of dangerous goods is sadly lacking in the charter industry. Loss of life is, of course the overwhelmingly most important consideration but not to be lightly dismissed is that aircraft hull and liability insurance underwriters will repudiate claims caused by illegal carriage of dangerous goods (or for that matter unknown cargo) even if the dangerous goods did not cause the incident.

It is without any shadow of doubt your responsibility to ensure that you are aware of the implications, both from a legal and moral point of view, of non-compliance with both the Cargo Security and Dangerous Goods regulations.

Article by Rob Garbett, Honorary Director for Life of the Commercial Aviation Association of Southern Africa and Managing Director of Professional Aviation Services (Pty) Ltd.

Article previously published in the CAASA newsletter of May 2013

 

The space between vigilance and paranoia

The security of air cargo has lagged behind stringent baggage and passenger security, a massive flaw in the armour of airline security.

80 % of air cargo worldwide lands up on passenger aircraft.

The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) has devised, in consultation with air carriers, forwarding and security organisations and governments, a system of checks, balances, procedures and requirements summarised together in Annexure 17 to the Chicago convention on International Civil Aviation (safeguarding International Civil Aviation against acts of unlawful interference) which is the mechanism devised to enhance air cargo security.

In South Africa the Regulations required to comply with ICAO Annexure 17 have been incorporated into the Civil Aviation Regulations of 1997 under Part 108 of the Regulations by the South African Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA).

The essence of the Regulations is that cargo from a known, and validated, source (consignors) passing through known and validated agents, and certified as such, may be accepted by air carriers as Known Cargo which then requires no further security, apart from random checks. If cargo does not qualify as Known Cargo delays, and the formidable risk of rejection of liability claims in the event of an incident, will be the consequence.

The SACAA Technical Standards, together with the Regulations, forms the foundation upon which the security procedures, measures and training may be formulated and introduced.

The technologies that have been implemented covering the carrying of weapons and other dangerous articles in passenger’s carry on baggage is meaningful and a forceful deterrent against the introduction of explosive and dangerous articles. However, this technology is questionable when applied to air cargo which consists of thousands of different shapes, sizes and differing materials often combining these materials.

It is indisputable that there is no single, technical or other practical, security control applied to air cargo that is infallible and that will not be able to be bypassed by a determined terrorist. ICAO have therefore devised this integrated system that involves all the segments of the supply conduit line from the consignor, or sender, through the hands of the forwarding or courier agent, the air carrier or handling agent, ramp handling agent and those responsible for loading the aircraft. In this way every entity becomes an active participant in air cargo security not only creating a secure conduit but also creating an audit trail which, in itself, is a tactic of deterrence.

Personnel employed at, and along, all stages of the conduit, must all undergo Air Cargo Security Familiarisation Training (and in certain specific cases formal training) as well as background checks including criminal checks. The premises of each of the control entities in the chain must be audited and made secure. Procedures set out in Air Cargo Security manuals, approved by the Civil Aviation Authority, dictate operational procedures.

Cargo having passed through the process becomes Known Cargo.

If Unknown Cargo is presented to a forwarding, courier agent or air carrier it must be made known by applying one, or more, of the security controls that are recommended in the Part 108 Technical Standards.

It is vital, and indeed a moral obligation that all parties involved in the movement of cargo must apply on-going vigilance and co-operation from consignor to aircraft.

Aviation safety is an absolute. It is not the quest for zero defect. It IS zero defect (with acknowledgement to Professor Johann Coetzee). This must be the standard that is applied at all times. Compromise or complacency must not be tolerated. The lives of innocent people could well depend on the quality of participation of all those that are involved in the movement of air cargo.

The Lockerbie disaster required an explosive device the size of a man’s fist to tragically affect the lives of hundreds of people. Binary explosives are the combination of two inert chemicals which, when combined even in small quantities, cause a powerful explosion using a low temperature detonator, these are unlikely to be detected by technical means.

It is almost a foregone conclusion that unless there is on-going and active stimulation of Part 108 measures, this potential complacency will set in. This will be balanced by the forwarding, or courier, agents having to appoint specifically trained Designated Officials who are responsible to the Civil Aviation Authority to ensure that the measures are implemented and are on-going. These Designated Officials are also responsible to ensure that the senders of cargo (consignors) implement and continue to apply the Part 108 security measures. The Civil Aviation Inspectorate, formed for this specific purpose, will also play a major role in the on-going vigilance required.

Liability insurance underwriters will certainly take a dim view of non compliance with these measures, which create a real possibility of claims being repudiated, and we should all be aware that claims involving passenger aircraft may well run to hundreds of millions of USD.

The silver lining is that these measures will increase general logistics security and help to deter fraud.

Article by Rob Garbett, Managing Director of Professional Aviation Services.